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Teaching Secure Programming to Information Systems 
Students via OWASP Techniques and Libraries  
 
Carey Cole 








Current and future Information Systems (IS) personnel and management need to understand SQL Injection, cross-site 
scripting (XSS), and other web-originating information security vulnerabilities. These can have severe negative impacts, and 
minimizing these threats is an important consideration for application developers. There are many resources on the Internet 
and in books to help educate people about these and similar intrusions.  The Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) includes a robust amount of information on this subject and is an excellent starting point in the creation of lecture, 
demonstration, and student practice on the subject.  Using OWASP resources and active software examples is an effective 
and efficient method to teach IS students on potential security breaches and their prevention.  
Keywords  
SQL Injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), enterprise security API, OWASP, IT security education. 
INTRODUCTION 
IT Security is a major concern in many organizations, especially those providing web-based access to their systems. 
Although security measures like SSL and firewalls provide important protection measures, these do not go far enough in 
addressing vulnerabilities that exist via inputs from users on browsers. The two most common such vulnerabilities are SQL 
Injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS).  
SQL Injection and cross site scripting attacks happen frequently and can be very damaging.  From 2005 to 2007, Albert 
Gonzales and two Russians were involved in stealing about 130 million credit card numbers from several companies of 
which one was 7-11 (Bhushan, 2009).  The first Cross Scripting attack on October 4, 2005, was called the “Samy Worm”.  
The target was the personal profiles for 32 million users in MySpace.  MySpace had to shut down to fix the attack (Grossman 
2007). 
These and other security attacks and vulnerabilities have made it increasingly important to improve educational coverage of 
IT security issues in core Information Systems curricula. This is true in the managerially oriented coursework, in which best 
practices and security policy formation would be discussed, and also in the technical coursework such as software 
development courses, in which students should learn about effective coding techniques for preventing SQL injection, XSS, 
and other security threats.  
Traditionally, computer programming classes that include security components have concentrated on the development of 
security algorithms. But for an Information Systems curriculum, unlike a computer science curriculum, students typically do 
not gain sufficient coding skills to be able to implement these algorithms; nor should this be necessary from a practical 
perspective. Rather, a more appropriate venue for these students would involve training in how to utilize existing class 
libraries and methods for securing their software applications. 
In this paper, we explore the use of the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) and it Enterprise Security API 
(ESAPI) for teaching students about the best practices for secure coding as well as the use of pre-existing security classes and 
methods.  
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THE OPEN WEB APPLICATION SECURITY PROJECT (OWASP) 
Many different types of potential security issues exist for any business application.  The Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP) is an open source community that targets web application security issues and provides resources to help 
people prevent them from occurring.  
Periodically, OWASP documents a Top 10 list of web application risks (OWASP 2010), based on a rating methodology 
centered on two main components:  the threat agent and the system vulnerability. Threat agent factors include skill level, 
motive, opportunity and size. Vulnerability factors include ease of discovery, ease of exploit, awareness, and intrusion 
detection. Figure 1 illustrates the metrics particularly as they are applied to vulnerabilities. In this figure, we see that there is 
much unknown about the threat agents themselves; as for the business impacts, these depend on the particular needs and 
circumstances of the organization involved. So, the primary considerations that come into play are the vulnerabilities 
themselves, which include the attack vectors (e.g. input tags on HTML forms), the system weaknesses (e.g. injection flaws, 
coding holes, insufficient authentication, etc.), and the technical impacts of exploitation. Indeed some of these elements tie 
into the threat agents themselves. For example, the prevalence and detectability of system weakness impacts the opportunity 
and motive of the agent; the easier the system is to exploit, the greater the likelihood that the agent will continue to pursue his 
or her exploitation attempt. 
 
Figure 1: OWASP metrics for evaluating web application security risks (from OWASP, Top 10 – 2010) 
According to the OWASP 2010 Top 10 ratings (OWASP, Top 10 – 2010), SQL Injection Flaws are the number one risk, 
most notably because they are so easy to exploit and the technical impact of exploitation is so severe. Cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities are second on the list largely because they are extremely prevalent in web applications and they are also very 
easy to detect.  
OWASP provides cheat sheets for each of the various web risks.  The details in each cheat sheet vary but some of the items 
that may be included in each are an introduction that describes the risk, risk defenses, prevention measures that do not work, 
rules, and general recommendations.  Cheat Sheets may include best practices to minimize a risk from occurring and include 
excellent links to related articles. 
The SQL Injection prevention cheat sheet is particularly good (OWASP, SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet).  This cheat 
sheet includes an introduction, primary defenses, and additional defenses.  The introduction describes SQL injection 
prevention methods that are available to minimize potential issues with end-users inputting invalid data and the use of 
dynamic queries by programmers.  The following are the defenses and examples listed on the web site: 
Primary Defenses  
• Option #1: Use of Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries) 
• Option #2: Use of Stored Procedures 
• Option #3: Escaping all User Supplied Input 
Additional Defenses: 
• Also Enforce: Least Privilege 
• Also Perform: White List Input Validation 
 
The various defenses from the SQL Injection Prevention cheat sheet are presented using several different programming 
languages.  For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the Java examples.  Not all of the Cheat Sheet Java code 
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required is included in the examples below.  For all of the Java code needed, refer to the OWASP SQL Injection Prevention 
web site.  The following is a basic dynamic query in Java.   
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = "  +  
request.getParameter("customerName"); 
 
The variable called customerName is where the information entered by an end-user on web page is stored and used by the 
query.  If the user enters something like Tom' or '1'='1 the statement will executed as   
 
SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name =  'Tom' or '1' = '1' which will always work 
since 1 is always equal to 1.  Of course this is not what the programmer intended to happen. 
 
The use of parameterized of queries is the first option that should be used to minimize SQL injection.  A parameterized query 
will treat what is entered by an end-user like it has quotes around it and literally look for a customerName of  'Tom' or '1' = '1' 
.  Of course there will not be a customer with that name so the query will not process as SQL injection but as a query looking 
for a customer name of 'Tom' or '1' = '1'.  An example of a Java parameterized query that revises the dynamic query on the 
website follows where the ?  is where the parameter will be added: 
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ? "; 
 
The use of stored procedures is the second option that should be used to minimize SQL injection.  Like a parameterized 
query, a stored procedure query will treat what is entered by an end-user like it has quotes around it and literally look for a 
customerName of  'Tom' or '1' = '1' (as long as the stored procedure is implemented correctly).  Of course there will not be a 
customer with that name so the query will not process as SQL injection but as a query looking for a customer name of 'tom’ 
or '1' = '1'.  An example of a Java stored procedure query that revises the original dynamic query on the website follows 
where the stored procedure will be used. The stored procedure must be already created on the database server and accept the 
customerName as a parameter. 
The use of escaping is the third option that should be used to minimize SQL injection. OWASP provides a free API that you 
can download called ESAPI (The OWASP Enterprise Security API).  This API will encapsulate anything passed to it with a 
single quote on each side of it and like a parameterized query and stored procedure, the query will literally look for a 
customerName of  'Tom' or '1' = '1' .  Again, there will not be a customer with that name so the query will not process as SQL 
injection but as a query looking for a customer name of 'Tom' or '1' = '1'.   
In addition to either using parameterized queries, stored procedures, or escaping, validation and white list input validation 
should be incorporated into a web application Validation is where you verify that the data entered into a form is reasonable.  
For example when expecting a zip code only numbers should be allowed.   White list input validation is where you explicitly 
state what is acceptable in a field in a form.  For example, a last name may only include upper and lower cases letters, 
hyphens, and single apostrophe.  If anything else is input, an error message would be displayed. 
The Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Cheat Sheet is also very good. This cheat sheet includes an introduction and eight prevention 
rules. The introduction includes information on XSS untrusted data, escaping or encoding, Injection theory and escaping up 
or down, prevention model.  The following eight prevention rules are listed on the web site: 
• Rule 0 - Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations Option #2: Use of Stored Procedures 
• Rule 1 - HTML Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Element Content 
• Rule 2 - Attribute Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Common Attributes 
• Rule 3 - JavaScript Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into JavaScript Data Values 
• Rule 4 - CSS Escape And Strictly Validate Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Style Property Values 
• Rule 5 - URL Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML URL Parameter Values 
• Rule 6 - Use an HTML Policy engine to validate or clean user-driven HTML in an outbound way 
• Rule 7 - Prevent DOM-based XSS 
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In addition, OWASP provide excellent PowerPoint slides in their Presentation web page (OWASP, Category: OWASP 
Presentations). There are numerous presentations on SQL Injection and other topics 
 
OWASP’S ESAPI AS AN EDUCATIONAL TOOL FOR TEACHING SECURE CODING PRACTICES 
There have been many attempts to incorporate secure coding practices into information systems and computer programming 
curricula. Ralevich and  Martinovic (2010) describe an IS security curriculum for which one of the major goals is that 
students will be able to develop secure programming solutions in object-oriented and procedural programming languages. 
Taylor and Kaza (2011) presented a coding project specifically geared to various security injections, with the idea to instill a 
“security mindset” in the student population, and found that student awareness of security coding concepts improved 
significantly as a result. Although security is an increasing focus in many undergraduate IS programs, most secure coding 
content is done via computer science courses (Perez et al, 2011), which tend to focus on higher-level programming skills for 
actually implementing security-related algorithms. This material may be too technically demanding for the average 
information systems student.  
For most IS students, the important technical question is not how to implement a security algorithm, but how to recognize and 
use the appropriate algorithms for mitigating an organization’s IT security vulnerabilities within their software applications. 
This is where the OWASP Enterprise Security Application Programmer Interface (ESAPI) can be of great assistance as a 
pedagogical tool.  
The ESAPI is a library of classes and functions developed by members of the OWASP community that address the major 
vulnerabilities typically found in web-based applications. Figure 2 shows the overall ESAPI architecture. While the ESAPI 
library supports a wide variety of security needs, in this paper we focus on the top two vulnerabilities identified by OWASP: 
SQL Injection and Cross Site Scripting. 
 
Figure 2: OWASP’s enterprise security API (Williams 2008) 
 
As you can see, the ESAPI includes classes that address a wide variety of security concerns, including authentication, access 
control, input validation and encoding (which will be discussed in detail below), encryption, user logging, and intrusion 
detection. This library is not intended as a substitute for a particular framework’s existing security features, but instead as a 
supplement. The library is currently available for Java and PHP, and there are efforts by the OWASP community to extend it 
to .NET. 
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Because it is free, is accompanied by a strong supporting contingent of OWASP methodologies and best practices, and is 
very to use, the ESAPI serves as an ideal pedagogical framework for teaching secure programming practices. In the following 
two sections, we address OWASP and ESAPI approaches to the top two web security risks: SQL injection and cross site 
scripting. 
From a pedagogical perspective, an initial presentation on the OWASP definitions and information is a great way to start 
people’s education.  The concepts can be strongly reinforced by a demonstration that shows on how easy it is to make a 
successful attack.  It is one thing to describe how easy SQL Injection can be used in a negative way; it is another to actually 
demonstrate that fact.  The students’ awareness of the ease of something like SQL Injection increased significantly based on 
the classroom response after they saw SQL Injection for the first time.  Lastly, a hands-on piece would be ideal to reinforce 
the concepts even more.   
 
SQL INECTION EXAMPLE 
SQL injection flaws are currently ranked as #1 on OWASP’s Top 10 risk list. Figure 3 illustrates OWASP’s ratings on the 
important vulnerability indicators for SQL injection. 
 
Figure 3: OWASP’s assessment of SQL Injection risk  (from OWASP, Top 10 – 2010) 
 
Before showing a SQL Injection example it is important to spend some time reviewing the concept of SQL and how injection 
can occur.  SQL is the mechanism needed to select, update, insert, and delete records in a Relational database such 
Microsoft’s SQL Server or Oracle.  In general, the term injection refers to inserting characters into a string in the attempt to 
break out of a data context and into a code context. In the case of SQL injection, this involves characters with special 
meaning to a SQL database engine. In the case of XSS, it involves characters with special meaning to web browsers. SQL 
Injection can occur when an application requires end-users to complete a form where the input from the form is used to 
dynamically generate a SQL statement.  When an end-user enters data in the way that it was intended (i.e., the user name 
includes only valid last user name type characters), the SQL statement will perform as desired and expected.  However, SQL 
Injection occurs when an end-user enters special characters in a form in an attempt to cause a SQL statement to perform in a 
manner that was not intended (notice in the examples below, an extra quote and hyphens were added).  There are several 
other considerations, such as permissions, that will impact of the effect of the SQL statement but this illustrates the main 
concern:  SQL Injection can cause an application to execute SQL that was not intended.   
For the purposes of the following example a typical login screen will be used with Java as the programming language and 
SQL Server as the database.  Initially, the login screen will appear like the following figure. 
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Figure 4: Typical user login screen 
Initally the Java code will use a dynamic query that is written as follows where LoginCredentials was table created to 
emmulate the storage of a username and password, and EmployeeID  a link to an Employee table.  None of the data is 
encrypted for the purposes of the example in order to show the actual query results. 
String SQL = "SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, EMP_ID FROM [LoginCredentials] where USERNAME = '" 
+ userName + "' and PASSWORD = '" + passWord + "'"; 
If a valid username and password is entered as shown in the following figure: 
 
Figure 5: Legitimate user login 
 
The dynamic query will run as SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, EMP_ID FROM [LoginCredentials] where 
USERNAME = 'colecb' and PASSWORD = 'colecb'. 
However, if SQL Injection is attempted as shown in the following figure 
 
Figure 6: SQL injection attempt 
 
The dynamic query will run as SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, EMP_ID FROM [LoginCredentials] where 
USERNAME = '' or 1=1 --' and PASSWORD = ''.  Notice in the code above that everthing is commented after the 1=1 
statement thus the statement is really processed as SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, EMP_ID FROM 
[LoginCredentials] where USERNAME = '' or 1=1.  The results are that anyone could login to the system this way. 
If we change the dynamic query to a parametrized query the  query will run as SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, 
EMP_ID FROM [LoginCredentials] where USERNAME = ? and PASSWORD = ?.  The login used in this attempt will not 
work since the query looks for a user name of ' or 1=1 and one does not exist.   
An invalid login will also occur if a stored procedure is called from Java that looks like the following: 
PROCEDURE [dbo].[sp_getUserName] @UserName varchar(25), @Password varchar(25) AS BEGIN 
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SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, EMP_ID FROM [LoginCredentials]  
where USERNAME = @UserName 
and PASSWORD = @Password 
END 
Escaping is the third option to consider as a way to minimize the possibility of SQL Injection, but according to OWASP this 
should be a last resort (OWASP, SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet).  The term escaping (also called encoding) refers to 
a programmatic means of converting code-triggering characters in strings to harmless (i.e. data context) characters. If the 
effort to update a legacy system to parameterized queries or stored procedures is too time consuming or risky, then escaping 
should be considered.  Remember that OWASP provides an API for these purposes. The following figure shows a possible 
input of the string ' or 1=1 --. The first System.out.println example uses escaping and the second one does not. 
 
Figure 7: Java code containing OWASP ESAPI library call for encoding SQL 
 
 
Notice that the figure below displays the output of the initial string in two ways.  The first example below shows the SQL 
with the API.  Notice that this code cannot be used for SQL Injection.  The second example shows the SQL without escaping.  
This condition allows for the possibility of SQL Injection.   
 
 
Figure 8: Output of encoded and unencoded strings from Figure 7’s code 
 
It is worth noting that the SQL presented above does not include sophisticated or advanced statements; they are basic ones 
that are taught in any introductory database class.  People abusing SQL Injection can be performed by anyone who knows 
basic SQL. 
 
CROSS SITE SCRIPTING EXAMPLE 
Cross site scripting (XSS) is currently #2 on OWASP’s Top 10 risk list. Figure 9 illustrates OWASP’s ratings on the 
important vulnerability indicators for XSS. 
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Figure 9: OWASP’s assessment of XSS risk  (from OWASP, Top 10 – 2010) 
 
XSS vulnerabilities are especially prevalent in web applications that allow HTML and/or JavaScript to be input by end users. 
Social networking sites and email applications are two common examples. In this section, we consider an example of a job 
posting site (like a monster.com) in which job applicants submit information about themselves including a resume, and 
employers search for and read the information input by the applicants. In this scenario, we imagine that a job applicant (the 
threat agent) inserts HTML and JavaScript code into his or her posted resume, and we explore the potential impact that this 
action can have. We follow with a simple OWASP ESAPI object reference and method call that mitigates this intrusion 
attempt. 
Consider a job applicant page in which the user enters a name, email address and “About Me” blurb, which could be a 
resume and/or other personal information about the job applicant. Assuming the About Me posting is a large enough text area 
on the web page, a user might enter quite a bit of text. Figure 10 illustrates such a page. Note that the user has entered HTML 
and JavaScript code into the About Me area. 
 
Figure 10: Example XSS code attempt by evil job candidate (HTML form with JavaScript) 
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In the above web page, the user has inserted an HTML form with a Submit <input> tag, along with a <script> tag with a 
JavaScript function that will be invoked when an unsuspecting user (a potential employer in this example) clicks the button. 
When the user submits this information, the web application will insert it into the database. As a result of this input, and in 
the absence of preventative validation and/or encoding measures in the web application itself, the host’s database will store 
the About Me information exactly as entered.  
Note that none of the items in this entry involve SQL injection attempts. Unlike the examples from the previous section, there 
is no danger of doing damage to the web application host environment by injecting into the SQL engine itself. Therefore, the 
precautions mentioned above are of no use. Parameterized queries are important for preventing SQL injection, but are useless 
for preventing XSS. 
An employer who subsequently logs in may be presented with a list of job candidates, as shown below. 
 
Figure 11: Unsuspecting employer selects a job candidate to look for 
 
 
Selecting an innocent job candidate may result in display of that person’s information: 
 
Figure 12: Selecting a legitimate job candidate results in information display from database query 
 
But selecting the hacker who entered the HTML and JavaScript would produce this result: 
 
Figure 13: Selecting the evil candidate results in XSS injection code displaying the form and button; clicking the 
button sends sensitive data to the bad guy’s web site 
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The Push Me button is a classic example of social engineering, an attempt to manipulate the employer’s behavior (Workman, 
2007). If the employer pushes that button, his or her email and password will be sent to the hacker’s web site, where it could 
be stored into a database and/or used for further nefarious activities. Note that social engineering is not necessary for XSS; it 
was only used in this example for illustrative purposes. 
The solution for this particular example is to perform what is commonly called escaping, or to use another term, encoding. 
For example, OWASP’s Java-based ESAPI includes an Encoder interface (implemented by a DefaultEncoder class). This 
interface includes methods for a wide variety of encodings, including SQL, HTML tags and attributes, JavaScript, CSS, 
LDAP, URL, XML tags and attributes, and XPath. (OWASP, Java API documentation). In general, these encoders work by 
converting the symbols that could be used for injection of the relevant interpreters into harmless substitutes; i.e., mitigating 
the threat agent’s attempt at converting a data context into a code context. For example, key HTML injection symbols include 
the open and close angle brackets “<” and “>”. HTML encoding converts these symbols into “&lt;” and “&gt;” respectively 
(http://www.w3schools.com/html/html_entities.asp).  
For, example, assume this was the original code for inserting a job applicant’s data into the database via a parameterized SQL 




Figure 14: Unprotected code setting SQL parameters directly from form fields 
 
The following change to the code mitigates the injection attempt by encoding the HTML symbols: 
 
Figure 15: Utilizing OWASP ESAPI HTML encoding functionality 
 
 
The resulting HTML encoding will result in the database containing this data instead of the original data entered by the job 
applicant: 
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Figure 16: Resulting string stored to database replaces HTML symbols with their encoded values 
 
Therefore, the display that will occur to the employer when selecting the hacker will look like this: 
 
Figure 17: Bud guy’s injection attempt becomes a harmless display on employers screen 
 
 
In this simple case, the solution was to perform HTML encoding, which is what the encodeforHTML method does. 
According to OWASP the best practices recommendations, HTML entity encoding by itself is not sufficient for guarding 
against XSS risks (OWASP, XSS Cross site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet). But it is one tool in a web developer’s 
arsenal, and when used in conjunction with other tools and techniques, it can help minimize these kinds of threats. It is also 
important to consider that sometimes a web developer may want users to be able to enter certain (but not all) HTML and even 
JavaScript code. For these purposes, OWASP’s ESAPI includes an HTML policy engine and sanitizer that can be used to 
selectively allow a subset of HTML symbols and/or JavaScript functions (Weinberger et al 2011). Once students learn the 
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methodologies espoused by OWASP and gain practice in using the simpler classes of the ESAPI library, they can get more 
advanced experience by utilizing the policy engine and sanitizer provided for more refined encoding and validation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The OWASP website has a significant amount of information that includes guidelines and recommendations related to 
security risks, and software tools and libraries which enable programmers to put these guidelines into practice. Our paper has 
only scratched the surface on the types of possible security attacks and the information available.  Using the OWASP is an 
excellent resource and should be considered when training students about best practices with regard to securing web 
applications.  Additional training using demonstrations and hands-on exercises will enhance the learning experience.  As you 
can see SQL Injection and Cross Site Scripting are easy to take advantage of but equally as easy to minimize or eliminate.  It 
will be less costly if people understand how to write code correctly so that they will not have to rewrite them or allow the 
business to suffer as a result of web attacks. Integrating the knowledge and skills OWASP provides, along with the security 
features of the ESAPI, into a school’s IS curriculum helps prepare students to respond effectively to the information security 
threats they will encounter throughout their professional lives.  
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